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Abstract
An input to the Popular Matching problem, in the roommates setting, consists of a
graph G and each vertex ranks its neighbors in strict order, known as its preference. In the
Popular Matching problem the objective is to test whether there exists a matching M?
such that there is no matching M where more people are happier with M than with M?.
In this paper we settle the computational complexity of the Popular Matching problem
in the roommates setting by showing that the problem is NP-complete. Thus, we resolve an
open question that has been repeatedly, explicitly asked over the last decade.
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1 Introduction
Matching problems with preferences are ubiquitous in everyday life scenarios. They arise in
applications such as the assignment of students to universities, doctors to hospitals, students to
campus housing, pairing up police officers, kidney donor-recipient pairs and so on. The common
theme is that individuals have preferences over the possible outcomes and the task is to find
a matching of the participants that is in some sense optimal with respect to these preferences.
In this paper we study the computational complexity of computing one such solution concept,
namely the Popular Matching problem. The input to the Popular Matching problem
consists of a graph on n vertices and the preferences of the vertices represented as a ranked
list of the neighbors of every vertex, said to be the preference list of the vertex. The goal is to
find a popular matching–a matching that is preferred over any other matching (in terms of the
preference lists) by at least half of the vertices in the graph.
Popular matching finds real-life applications in avenues as diverse as the organ-donor ex-
change markets, spectrum sharing in cellular networks, barter exchanges, to just name a few
[24, 28]. Specifically, situations in which a stable matching – a matching that does not admit a
blocking edge, i.e. an edge whose endpoints prefer each other to their respective “situation” in
the current matching – is too restrictive, popular matching finds applicability. It is known that
stable matching is the smallest sized popular matching. So for applications where it is desirable
to have matchings of larger size than a stable matching – for instance, allocating projects to
students, or pairing up police officers, where the absence of blocking edges is not mandatory –
popular matching may be a suitable alternative. The notion of popularity captures a natural
relaxation of the notion of stability: blocking edges are permitted but the matching, nevertheless
has overall stability
To define the Popular Matching problem formally, we first need few definitions. Let
NG(v) denotes the neighborhood of a vertex v ∈ V (G). Given a vertex v ∈ V (G), a preference
list of v in G is a bijective function `v : NG(v) → {1, 2, . . . , |NG(v)|}. Informally, the smaller
the number a vertex v ∈ V (G) assigns to a vertex u ∈ NG(v), the more v prefers to be matched
to u. In particular, for all u,w ∈ NG(v), if `v(u) < `v(w), then v prefers u over w. A matching
M in G is a subset of E(G) whose edges are pairwise disjoint. We say that a vertex v ∈ V (G)
is matched by a matching M if there exists a (unique) vertex u ∈ V (G) such that {u, v} ∈ M ,
which we denote by u = M(v).
In literature, the terminology related to Popular Matching is closely related to that of the
Stable Marriage problem. When the input graph is (bipartite) arbitrary, the instance is said
to be that of the (stable marriage) roommates setting of the problem. We denote an instance
of Popular Matching (in the roommates setting) by I = (G,L = {`v : v ∈ V (G)}). Roughly
speaking, a vertex v ∈ V (G) prefers a matching M over a matching M ′ if its “status” in M is
better than the one in M ′, where being not matched is the least preferred status. Formally, the
notion of preference over matchings is defined as follows. Given two matchings in G, denoted by
M and M ′, we say that a vertex v ∈ V (G) prefers M over M ′ if one of the following conditions is
satisfied: (i) v in matched by M but not matched by M ′; (ii) v is matched by both M and M ′,
and `v(M(v)) < `v(M
′(v)). We say that M ′ is more popular than M , if the number of vertices
that prefer M ′ to M exceeds the number of vertices that prefer M to M ′. A matching M is
popular if and only if there is no matching M ′ that is more popular than M . In the decision
version of the Popular Matching problem, given an instance I = (G,L = {`v : v ∈ V (G)}),
the question is whether there exists a popular matching?
History of the problem and our result. The provenance of the notion of a popular matching
can be dated to the work of Condorcet in 1785 on the subject of a Condorcet winner [9]. In
the last century, however, the notion was introduced as the majority assignment by Ga¨rdenfors
[11] in 1975. Anecdotal retelling ascribes the coinage of the term “popular matching” and the
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associated question of does there exist a polynomial time algorithm for Popular Matching
in the “housing allocation” setting, to Robert Irving during a talk in University of Glasgow in
2002, [24, pg 333]. In 2005, Abraham et al. [2] was the first to discuss an efficient algorithm
for computing a popular matching albeit for the case where the graph is bipartite and only
the vertices in one of the partitions have a preference list, a setting known as the housing
allocation. The persuasive motivation and elegant analysis of Abraham et al. led to a spate
of papers on popular matching [23, 14, 20, 18, 19, 3, 15, 21] covering diverse settings that
include strict preferences as well as one with ties. It is well-known that when the input graph
is bipartite–the stable marriage setting, Popular Matching problem can always be decided
affirmatively in polynomial time, [13]. It is equally well-known that when the graph is arbitrary,
the computational complexity of deciding whether a popular matching exists is unknown. In
particular, whether Popular Matching is NP-hard has been repeatedly, explicitly asked as
an open question over the last decade [1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 12, 13, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 24]. Indeed, it has
been stated as one of the main open problem in the area (see the aforementioned citations). In
this paper we settle this question by proving the following result.
Theorem 1. Popular Matching is NP-complete.
Our method. An optimization question related to the Popular Matching is about finding
a popular matching of the largest size (as not all popular matchings are of same size). Let this
problem be called Max Sized Popular Matching. Until recently, it was also not known
whether this problem is NP-hard in roommate setting. Recently, Kavitha investigated the
computational complexity of Max Sized Popular Matching in arbitrary graphs [17], and
showed it to be NP-hard. This reduction serves as one of the main three gadgets in our reduction–
the other two gadgets are completely new. The design of our reduction required several new
insights. Firstly, our source problem is a “3-SAT-like” variant of Vertex Cover, which allows
us to enjoy benefits of both worlds: we gain both the lack of “optimization constraints” as in
3-SAT, and the simplicity of Vertex Cover. The usage of this source problem requires us to
encode selection of exactly one “element” out of two, and exactly two “elements” out of three.
Here, our gadget design is carefully tailored to exploit a known characterization of a popular
matching. In particular, we make use of “troublemaker triangles”–these are triangles consisting
of three vertices, one of whom must be matched to a vertex outside the triangle to give rise to a
popular matching. We embed these triangles in a structure that coordinates the way in which
they can be traversed. Here, traversal precisely refers to the above mentioned characterization,
which relies on the exposure of certain alternating paths and cycles in a graph associated with
a candidate matching (to be a popular matching). Our gadgets lead traversals of such paths
and cycles to dead-ends. We remark that when we describe our gadgets, we present additional
intuitive explanations of their design.
Related results. Chung [4] was the first to study the Popular Matching problem in the
roommates setting. He observed that every stable matching is a popular matching. In the midst
of a long series of articles, the issue of the computational complexity of Popular Matching in
an arbitrary graph remained unsettled, leading various researcher to devise notions such as the
unpopularity factor and unpopularity margin [14, 25, 12] in the hope of capturing the essence
of popular matchings. A solution concept that emerged from this search is the maximum sized
popular matching, motivated by the fact that unlike stable matchings (Rural Hospital Theorem
[26]), all popular matchings in an instance do not match the same set of vertices or even have
the same size. Thus, it is natural to focus on the size of a popular matching. There is a series of
papers that focus on the Max Sized Popular Matching problem in bipartite graphs (without
ties in preference lists) [16, 13, 8] and (with ties) [7]. When preferences are strict, there are
various polynomial time algorithm that solve Max Sized Popular Matching in bipartite
graphs: Huang and Kavitha [12] give an O(mn0) algorithm that is improved by Kavitha to
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O(m) [16] where m and n0 denote the number of edges in the bipartite graph and the size
of the smaller vertex partition, respectively. In the presence of ties (even on one side), the
Max Sized Popular Matching was shown to be NP-hard [7]. It is worth noting that every
stable matching is popular, but the converse is not true. As a consequence of the former, every
bipartite graph has a popular matching that is computable in polynomial-time because it has
a stable matching computable by the famous Gale-Shapley algorithm described in the seminal
paper [10] by the eponymous Gale and Shapley.
2 Preliminaries
Standard Definitions and Our Notation. Given a graph G, we let V (G) and E(G) denote
the vertex set and edge set of G, respectively. Throughout the paper, we consider undirected
simple graphs. We view an edge as a set of two vertices. A triangle in G is a cycle in G on exactly
three vertices. The neighborhood of a vertex v ∈ V (G) in G is denoted by NG(v) = {u ∈ V (G) :
{u, v} ∈ E(G)}, and the set of edges incident to v in G is denoted by EG(v). Given a vertex
v ∈ V (G), a preference list of v in G is a bijective function `v : NG(v) → {1, 2, . . . , |NG(v)|}.
Informally, the smaller the number a vertex v ∈ V (G) assigns to a vertex u ∈ NG(v), the more
v prefers to be matched to u. In particular, for all u,w ∈ NG(v), if `v(u) < `v(w), then v prefers
u over w. A matching M in G is a subset of E(G) whose edges are pairwise disjoint. We say
that a vertex v ∈ V (G) is matched by a matching M if there exists a (unique) vertex u ∈ V (G)
such that {u, v} ∈ M , which we denote by u = M(v). Moreover, M is maximal if there is no
edge in E(G) such that both endpoints of that edge are not matched by M .
We denote an instance of Popular Matching (in the roommates setting) by I = (G,L =
{`v : v ∈ V (G)}). Roughly speaking, a vertex v ∈ V (G) prefers a matching M over a matching
M ′ if its “status” in M is better than the one in M ′, where being not matched is the least
preferred status. Formally, the notion of preference over matchings is defined as follows.
Definition 2.1. Let I = (G,L = {`v : v ∈ V (G)}) be an instance of Popular Matching.
Given two matchings in G, denoted by M and M ′, we say that a vertex v ∈ V (G) prefers M
over M ′ if one of the following conditions is satisfied: (i) v in matched by M but not matched
by M ′; (ii) v is matched by both M and M ′, and `v(M(v)) < `v(M ′(v)). The number of vertices
in V (G) that prefer M over M ′ is denoted by vote(M,M ′).
Roughly speaking, vote(M,M ′) above can be thought of as the number of vertices that will
vote in favor of M when they are asked to decide whether M or M ′ should be chosen. For
notational convenience, given a vertex v ∈ V (G), we denote `v(v) = |NG(v)| + 1, and given
a matching M where v is not matched, we denote M(v) = v. Then, for example, the first
condition in Definition 2.1 is subsumed by the second one. We now also formally define the
notion of popularity.
Definition 2.2. Let I = (G,L = {`v : v ∈ V (G)}) be an instance of Popular Matching.
We say that a matching M in G is popular if vote(M ′,M) − vote(M,M ′) ≤ 0 for any other
matching M ′ in G.
Intuitively, the meaning of the definition above is that when the vertices are asked whether
we should replace M by M ′, for any other matching M ′, the number of vertices that will vote
against the swap is at least as large as the number of vertices that will vote in favor of it. Let
us recall that in the Popular Matching problem, the objective is to decide whether there
exists a popular matching.
Given a graph G, we say that a vertex v ∈ V (G) covers an edge e ∈ E(G) if v is incident
to e, that is, v ∈ e. A vertex cover U in G is a subset of V (G) such that every edge in E(G) is
covered by at least one vertex in U . In the Vertex Cover problem, we are given a graph G
and an integer k, and the objective is to decide whether G has a vertex cover of size at most k.
3
Known characterization of popular matchings. We need to present (known) definitions
of a labeling of the edges in E(G) as well as of a special graph derived from G and a matching
M in G, which will give rise to a characterization of popular matchings.
Definition 2.3 (Definition 2 in [13], Rephrased). Let I = (G,L = {`v : v ∈ V (G)}) be an
instance of Popular Matching. Given a matching M in G, the edge labeling labelM :
(E(G) \M)→ {−2, 0,+2} is defined as follows.
labelM ({u, v}) =

−2 if `u(M(u)) < `u(v) and `v(M(v)) < `v(u)
+2 if `u(M(u)) > `u(v) and `v(M(v)) > `v(u)
0 otherwise
Intuitively, an edge in the definition above is assigned −2 if both its endpoints do not prefer
being matched to each other over their status in M , and it is assigned +2 if both its endpoints
prefer being matched to each other over their status in M .
Definition 2.4 ([13]). Let I = (G,L = {`v : v ∈ V (G)}) be an instance of Popular Match-
ing. Given a matching M in G, the graph GM is the subgraph of G with V (GM ) = V (G) and
E(GM ) = {{u, v} ∈ E(G) : {u, v} ∈M or labelM ({u, v}) 6= −2}.
Before we can present the characterization, we need to define the notions of an alternating
path and an alternating cycle in GM . First, an alternating cycle in GM is a cycle in GM (with
an even number of edges) such that if we traverse the edges of the cycle (in any direction), then
every edge in M is followed by an edge outside M , and every edge outside M is followed by an
edge in M . Similarly, an alternating path in GM is a path in GM such that if we traverse the
edges of the path (in any direction), then every edge in M is followed by an edge outside M
(with the exception of the last edge), and every edge outside M is followed by an edge in M
(with the same exception), and in addition, if the edge incident to the first or last vertex on the
path is not in M , then that vertex is not matched by M . Now, the characterization is given by
the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 (Theorem 1 in [13], Rephrased). Let I = (G,L = {`v : v ∈ V (G)}) be an
instance of Popular Matching. A matching M in G is popular if and only if the following
conditions hold in GM .
• There is no alternating cycle in GM that contains at least one edge labeled +2 by labelM .
• There is no alternating path in GM that starts from a vertex not matched by M and
contains at least one edge labeled +2 by labelM .
• There is no alternating path in GM that contains at least two edges labeled +2 by labelM .
We remark that the observation that Theorem 1 in [13] holds for general graphs (its state-
ment refers to bipartite graphs) is noted on page 6 of that paper. The usefulness of Proposition
2.1 for us is that it will help us verify that the matching we construct when we prove that
forward direction of the correctness of our reduction is indeed popular. Note that, if we are to
prove the popularity of matching by using only the definition of popularity, then we need to
compare the matching to a huge number of other matchings (that can be of a super-exponential
magnitude). Thus, Proposition 2.1 will come in handy.
3 Definition of Partitioned Vertex Cover
The correctness of our reduction will crucially rely on the fact that our source problem will
not be Vertex Cover, but a variant of it that we call Partitioned Vertex Cover. This
variant is defined as follows.
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Problem definition. The input of Partitioned Vertex Cover consists of a graph G, a
collection P of pairwise disjoint edges in G, and a collection T of pairwise disjoint sets of size 3
of vertices that induce triangles in G,1 such that every vertex in V (G) occurs in either a triangle
in T or an edge in P (but not in both). In other words, T ∪ P forms a partition of V (G) into
sets of sizes 3 and 2.
To ease readability, we will refer to a set (edge) in P as a pair and to a set in T as a triple.
The objective of Partitioned Vertex Cover is to decide whether G has a vertex cover
U such that the two following conditions hold.
1. For every P ∈ P, it holds that |U ∩ P | = 1.
2. For every T ∈ T , it holds that |U ∩ T | = 2.
A vertex cover U with the properties above will be referred to as a solution.
Remark and Hardness. We remark that it will be crucial for us that (i) the sets in T ∪ P
are all pairwise disjoint, (ii) the maximum size of a set in T ∪ P is only 3 and all but one of
the vertices of a set in T ∪ P must be selected, and (iii) all solutions must have the same size,
where the implicit size requirement (that is, being of size exactly |P| + 2|T |) is automatically
satisfied if Conditions 1 and 2 are satisfied.
Now, we claim that Partitioned Vertex Cover is NP-hard. The correctness of this
claim directly follows from a classic reduction from 3-SAT to Vertex Cover (see, e.g., [27]).
For the sake of completeness, we present this reduction and argue formally why its output can
be viewed correctly as an instance of Partitioned Vertex Cover (rather than an instance
of Vertex Cover) in Appendix A.
Lemma 3.1. Partitioned Vertex Cover is NP-hard.
4 Reducing Partitioned Vertex Cover to Popular Matching
Let I = (G,P, T ) be an instance of Partitioned Vertex Cover. In this section, we construct
an instance reduction(I) = (H,L = {`v : v ∈ V (H)}) of Popular Matching. Note that,
to avoid confusion, we denote the graph in reduction(I) by H rather than G, since the latter
already denotes the graph in I. We remark that the Edge Coverage gadget below is in fact
the entire reduction from (standard) Vertex Cover to an optimization variant of Popular
Matching recently given by Kavitha [17] (in that context, we will use notation consistent with
this work). Our two other gadgets are completely new. After describing the Edge Coverage
gadget, we briefly discuss its weakness. In particular, this brief discussion sheds light on the
jump in understanding the Popular Matching problem that we had to perform in order to
employ this known gadget (or any other similar gadget in the literature on popular matchings)
to prove the hardness of Popular Matching.
4.1 Edge Coverage
For every vertex i ∈ V (G), we add four new vertices (to H), denoted by ai, bi, ci and di. In
addition, we add the edges {di, ai}, {ai, bi}, {ai, ci} and {bi, ci} (see Fig. 1). Now, for every edge
e = {i, j} ∈ E(G), we add two vertices, uei and uej , and the edges {uei , uej}, {bi, uei} and {bj , uej}.
Let us now give a partial definition of the preference lists of the vertices added so far (see
Fig. 1). When we will add neighbors to some of these vertices, they will be appended to the
end of these partial lists, and we will not change the values that we are about to define. For
every vertex i ∈ V (G), we have the following definitions.
1That is, for all {x, y, z} ∈ T , we have that {x, y}, {y, z}, {z, x} ∈ E(G).
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Figure 1: The Edge Coverage gadget. Here, x ∈ {2, 3, . . . , |NG(i)| + 1} and y ∈
{2, 3, . . . , |NG(j)|+ 1}.
• Vertex ai: `ai(bi) = 1; `ai(ci) = 2; `ai(di) = 3.
• Vertex bi: `bi(ai) = 1; `bi restricted to {uei : e ∈ EG(i)} is an arbitrary bijection into
{2, 3, . . . , |EG(i)|+ 1};2 `bi(ci) = |NG(i)|+ 2.
• Vertex ci: `ci(ai) = 1; `ci(bi) = 2.
• Vertex di: `di(ai) = 1.
• Vertex uei for any e = {i, j} ∈ EG(i): `uei (uej) = 1; `uei (bi) = 2.
This completes the description of the Edge Coverage gadget.
Intuition. The Edge Coverage gadget aims to encode (as we will see in Section 5) the selection
of a vertex as follows. In every popular matching M , either {ai, bi} ∈ M or both {ai, di} ∈ M
and {bi, ci} ∈ M . The special choice of the preferences ensure this, where the first choice
indicates that i is present in the vertex cover encoded by M , while the second choice indicates
that i is not present in this vertex cover. Intuitively, ai and bi prefer each other the most,
but if we choose to match them, we “leave out” both di and ci, which gives rise to the two
configurations as above. Then, the addition of uei and u
e
j , which prefer each other the most, and
which are inserted in the “middle” of bi’s and bj ’s lists, respectively, will ensure that that every
edge is indeed covered. To establish this last claim, it will also be important that ci prefers ai
over bi—this will allow us to “move” from the configuration of having {ai, di}, {bi, ci} ∈M and
{aj , dj}, {bj , cj} ∈ M to one where ci and cj are matched to ai and aj , respectively, when we
try to exhibit a matching more popular than M .
While this gadget, already given by Kavitha [17], is very useful to us, its main drawback is
that it cannot enforce popular matchings to favor the selection of {bi, ci} ∈M and {ai, di} ∈M
over {ai, bi} ∈M . In other words, this gadget does not help us, in any way, to force the encoded
vertex cover to be as small as possible. (We remark that Kavitha [17] considers a variant of
Popular Matching where the matching should be as large as possible, and hence the inherent
difficulty of the problem is circumvented.) By considering Partitioned Vertex Cover rather
than Vertex Cover, we do not need to deal with such “size optimization” constraint anymore.
However, we now need to handle the constraints imposed by P and T . Nevertheless, these two
sets are very structured as explained in Section 3 (in sharp contrast to, say, an arbitrary instance
2That is, every vertex in {uei : e ∈ EG(i)} is assigned a unique integer from {2, 3, . . . , |EG(i)| + 1}, and it is
immaterial to us which bijection to choose to achieve this.
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Figure 2: The Pair Selector gadget.
of 3-SAT). In fact, every detail of the gadgets described next is carefully tailored to exploit the
extra structural properties of Partitioned Vertex Cover as much as possible, as will be
made clear in Section 5.
4.2 Pair Selector
For every pair {i, j} ∈ P with i < j, we add two new vertices (to H), denoted by fij and fji,
along with the edges {di, fij}, {fij , cj}, {dj , fji} and {fji, ci} (see Fig. 2). In addition, we insert
the edges {ci, dj} and {cj , di}.
We update the preference lists of the vertices as follows (see Fig. 2).
• Vertex ci: `ci(fji) = 3; `ci(dj) = 4.
• Vertex cj: `cj (fij) = 3; `cj (di) = 4.
• Vertex di: `di(cj) = 2; `di(fij) = 3.
• Vertex dj: `dj (ci) = 2; `dj (fji) = 3.
• Vertex fij: `fij (di) = 1; `fij (cj) = 2.
• Vertex fji: `fji(dj) = 1; `fji(ci) = 2.
Note that the definition above is valid since no vertex in V (G) participates in more than
one pair, and hence no integer is assigned by any function ` more than once. This completes
the description of the Pair Selector gadget.
Intuition. First, we would like to point out that the Pair Selector gadget is symmetric in the
sense that if we swap i and j, we obtain an isomorphic structure also with respect to preferences.
Thus, the gadget is well (uniquely) defined even if we drop the requirement “with i < j” above.
We will use this symmetry when we prove the correctness of our reduction.
To gain some deeper understanding of this gadget, let us recall that in Partitioned Vertex
Cover, exactly one vertex among {i, j} must be selected. We already know that the Edge
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Coverage gadget is meant to ensure that at least one vertex among {i, j} is selected. Hence, we
only need to ensure that not both i and j are selected. However, if both i and j are selected,
then both ci and dj are left not matched. Then, the preferences on the triangle on {ci, dj , fji}
are chosen specifically to “cause trouble”—no matter which edge of this triangle will be picked
by the matching, we can replace it by a different edge on this triangle to exhibit a more popular
matching. For example, if we pick {ci, fji}, then dj is left not matched, while fji prefers dj over
ci. This means that by replacing {ci, fji} by {fji, dj}, we make both fji and dj more satisfied,
while only ci becomes less satisfied (no other vertex in H is affected by the swap).
In light of the swap above, it may appear as if it would have been sufficient to keep the
triangle on {ci, dj , fji}, while removing the triangle on {cj , di, fij} from the gadget. However,
without the second triangle, the proof of the forward direction fails—the matching attempted to
construct from a vertex cover will not be popular. In particular, by having the second triangle
as well, we will always by able to match all of the vertices in H, and hence avoid the need to
consider the second condition in Proposition 2.1. Again, we stress that the second triangle is
not meant to ease the proof, but that without it the forward direction of the proof fails. It
is also worth to note here that only having these two triangles is not sufficient, but the exact
“orientation” of their preferences is crucial. In particular, if we changed the orientation of only
one of the triangles—for example, if we made ci prefer dj over fji, dj prefer fji over ci, and fji
prefer ci over dj—then the gadget would have no longer been symmetric, and the proof of the
forward direction would have failed. Roughly speaking, the two triangles on {ci, dj , fji} and
{cj , di, fij} “work together” to prevent the existence of alternating cycles that must not exist
by Proposition 2.1. Deeper coordination is required in the next gadget, and we will elaborate
on it more when we explain the intuition behind that gadget.
4.3 Triple Selector
For every triple {i, j, k} ∈ T with i < j < k, we add six new edges (to H): {di, dj}, {dj , dk},
{dk, di}, {ci, cj}, {cj , ck} and {ck, ci} (see Fig. 3).
We update the preference lists of the vertices as follows (see Fig. 3).
• Vertex ci: `ci(ck) = 3; `ci(cj) = 4.
• Vertex cj: `cj (ci) = 3; `cj (ck) = 4.
• Vertex ck: `ck(cj) = 3; `ck(ci) = 4.
• Vertex di: `di(dj) = 2; `di(dk) = 3.
• Vertex dj: `dj (dk) = 2; `dj (di) = 3.
• Vertex dk: `dk(di) = 2; `dk(dj) = 3.
Note that the definition above is valid since no vertex in V (G) participates in both a pair
and a triple, or in more than one triple, and hence no integer is assigned by any function `
more than once. This completes the description of the Triple Selector gadget.
Intuition. First, we would like to point out that the Triple Selector gadget is symmetric with
respect to cyclic shifts. That is, if we replace j by i, k by j, and i by k, then we obtain an
isomorphic structure also with respect to preferences. We will use this symmetry when we prove
the correctness of our reduction.
To gain some deeper understanding of this gadget, let us recall that in Partitioned Vertex
Cover, exactly two vertices among {i, j, k} must be selected. We already know that the Edge
Coverage gadget will ensure that at least two vertices among {i, j, k} are selected (since {i, j, k}
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Figure 3: The Triple Selector gadget.
induces a triangle in G and to cover the edges of a triangle at least two of its vertices must
be selected). Hence, we only need to ensure that not all of the vertices i, j and k are selected.
However, if i, j and k are all selected, then di, dj and dk are all left not matched. Then, the
preferences on the triangle on {di, dj , dk} are chosen specifically to “cause trouble” in a manner
similar to the Pair Selector gadget—again, no matter which edge of this triangle will be picked
by the matching, we can replace it by a different edge on this triangle to exhibit a more popular
matching. For example, if we pick {di, dj}, then dk is left not matched, while dj prefers dk over
di. This means that by replacing {di, dj} by {dj , dk}, we make both dj and dk more satisfied,
while only di becomes less satisfied (no other vertex in H is affected by the swap).
As in the case of the Pair Selector gadget, the inner triangle (in Fig. 3) on {di, dj , dk} is not
sufficient—the forward direction of the proof fails without the outer triangle on {ci, cj , ck}. Here,
to make the forward direction go through, an additional idea is required. Roughly speaking,
we need to have coordination between the triangles (recall that in the previous gadget, some
coordination was also noted as a requirement to ensure symmetry, but here deeper coordination
is required). Let us elaborate (in an non-formal manner) on the meaning of this coordination
here. Specifically, we “orient” the inner triangle and the outer triangle in different directions.
(Note that symmetry would have been achieved even if we would have oriented them in the
same direction.) By this, we mean that while in the inner triangle, di prefer dj over dk, dj
prefers dk over di, and dk prefers di over dj , the same does not hold when we rename d to be
c—here, the direction is reversed, as ci prefers ck over cj , cj prefers ci over ck, and ck prefers cj
over ci. This reversal will come in handy when we prove the forward direction, as it will “block
up” alternating cycles that must not exist by Proposition 2.1. Intuitively, the main insight is
that if we try to improve the matching we will construct in the proof of the forward direction
9
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Figure 4: Edges shown in bold are inserted into M (in Section 5.1). Edges labeled -2 by labelM
are marked by a red no entry sign, and edges labeled +2 by labelM are marked by a green
square.
in a “clockwise direction”, then we can make two d-type vertices more satisfied and only one
d-type vertex less satisfied, but at the same time, more c-type vertices become unsatisfied, and
hence we overall do not gain more popularity. In addition, if we try to improve the matching in
a “counter-clockwise direction”, then we can make two c-type vertices more satisfied and only
one c-type vertex less satisfied, but at the same time, more d-type vertices become unsatisfied,
and hence again we overall do not gain more popularity.
5 Correctness
In this section, we prove the correctness of our reduction. For the sake of clarity, the proof
is divided into two subsections, corresponding to the forward and reverse directions. Together
with Lemma 3.1, this proof will conclude the correctness of Theorem 1.
5.1 Forward Direction
Here, we prove that if there exists a solution to the instance (G,P, T ) of Partitioned Vertex
Cover, then there exists a popular matching in reduction(I) = (H,L = {`v : v ∈ V (H)}). For
this purpose, let us suppose that U is a solution to (G,P, T ). In what follows, we first construct
a matching M in H. Then, we will show that the graph HM (see Definition 2.4) satisfies several
useful properties, which will eventually lead us to the conclusion that M is popular.
Construction of M . The matching M is the union of the following sets.
• MU = {{uei , uej} : {i, j} ∈ E(G)}.
• For every {i, j} ∈ P with i < j, let x ∈ {i, j} be the vertex not in U , and y ∈ {i, j} be the
vertex in U , and insert the edges {ax, dx}, {bx, cx}, {ay, by}, {fxy, cy} and {fyx, dy} into
MP . (See Fig. 4.)
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Figure 5: Edges shown in bold are inserted into M (in Section 5.1). Edges labeled -2 by labelM
are marked by a red no entry sign, and edges labeled +2 by labelM are marked by a green
square.
• For every {i, j, k} ∈ T with i < j < k, let x ∈ {i, j, k} be the vertex not in U , and
y, z ∈ {i, j, k} be the two vertices in U such that dx prefers dy over dz, and insert the
edges {ax, dx}, {bx, cx}, {ay, by}, {az, bz}, {cy, cz} and {dy, dz} into MT . (See Fig. 5.)
Since the sets in P ∪T are pairwise disjoint, the sets above are well (uniquely) defined. We also
remark that the figures do not only capture the case where i = x due to the symmetry of our
gadgets (i.e., if j = x or k = x in the case of a triple, we obtain precisely the same figures).
Properties of HM . Let us start by observing that, since all vertices in H are matched by M ,
the following statement immediately holds.
Observation 5.1. There is no alternating path in HM that starts from a vertex not matched
by M and contains at least one edge labeled +2 by labelM .
We proceed to identify which edges in HM are labeled +2 by labelM .
Lemma 5.1. The set of edges labeled +2 by labelM is {{ai, bi} : i /∈ U} ∪ {{ai, ci} : i /∈ U}.
Proof. First, for all i /∈ U , we have that {ai, di} ∈ M and {bi, ci} ∈ M . Since ai prefers both
bi and ci over di, and both bi and ci prefer ai over each other, we have that all the edges in
{{ai, bi} : i /∈ U} ∪ {{ai, ci} : i /∈ U} are labeled +2 by labelM . Next, we show that all other
edges in H are not labeled +2 by labelM , which will complete the proof.
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Observe that for all i ∈ U , we have that {ai, bi} ∈ M , and since pai(bi) = pbi(ai) = 1,
this means the no edge incident to ai or bi can be labeled +2 by labelM . Similarly, for all
{i, j} ∈ E(G), we have that {uei , uej} ∈ M , and since puei (uej) = puej (uei ) = 1, this means the no
edge incident to uei or u
e
j can be labeled +2 by labelM . Thus, no edge that belongs to an Edge
Coverage gadget, excluding the edges in {{ai, bi} : i /∈ U} ∪ {{ai, ci} : i /∈ U}, is labeled +2 by
labelM .
Now, consider some pair {i, j} ∈ P with i < j, and let x ∈ {i, j} be the vertex not in U , and
y ∈ {i, j} be the vertex in U . Then, the edges {ax, dx}, {bx, cx}, {ay, by}, {fxy, cy} and {fyx, dy}
belong to M . However, cx prefers bx over both fyx and dy, and dx prefers ax over both fxy and
cy, which means that none of the edges {cx, fyx}, {cx, dy}, {dx, fxy} and {dx, cy} is labeled +2
by labelM .
Finally, consider some triple {i, j, k} ∈ T with i < j < k, and let x ∈ {i, j, k} be the vertex
not in U , and y, z ∈ {i, j, k} be the two vertices in U such that dx prefers dy over dz. Then,
the edges {ax, dx}, {bx, cx}, {ay, by}, {az, bz}, {cy, cz} and {dy, dz} belong to M . However, cx
prefers bx over both cy and cz, and dx prefers ax over both dy and dz, which means that none
of the edges {cx, cy}, {cx, cz}, {dx, dy} and {dx, dz} is labeled +2 by labelM .
Now, Lemma 5.1 directly implies the correctness of the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. For any P ∈ P, the only edges labeled +2 by labelM in the Pair Selector gadget
associated with P are {ax, bx} and {ax, cx} for the unique vertex x ∈ P that is not in U .
Similarly, for any T ∈ T , the only edges labeled +2 by labelM in the Triple Selector gadget
associated with T are {ax, bx} and {ax, cx} for the unique vertex x ∈ T that is not in U .
Having Lemma 5.2 at hand, we are ready to rule out the possibly of having a “bad” al-
ternating path that is completely contained inside a Pair Selector gadget or a Triple Selector
gadget.
Lemma 5.3. For any P ∈ P, there is no alternating path in HM that contains at least two edges
labeled +2 by labelM and which consists only of edges from the Pair Selector gadget associated
with P . Similarly, for any T ∈ T , there is no alternating path in HM that contains at least two
edges labeled +2 by labelM and which consists only of edges from the Triple Selector gadget
associated with T .
Proof. First, consider some pair P ∈ P. By Lemma 5.2, the only edges labeled +2 by M in the
Pair Selector gadget associated with P are {ax, bx} and {ax, cx} for the unique vertex x ∈ P that
is not in U . However, these two edges are part of a triangle in H, and therefore no alternating
path can contain both of them together.
Second, consider some triple T ∈ T . By Lemma 5.2, the only edges labeled +2 by M in the
Triple Selector gadget associated with T are {ax, bx} and {ax, cx} for the unique vertex x ∈ T
that is not in U . However, these two edges are again part of a triangle in H, and therefore no
alternating path can contain both of them together.
In the following two lemmas, we also rule out the possibly of having a “bad” alternating
cycle that is completely contained inside a Pair Selector gadget or a Triple Selector gadget.
Lemma 5.4. For any P ∈ P, there is no alternating cycle in HM that contains at least one edge
labeled +2 by labelM and which consists only of edges from the Pair Selector gadget associated
with P .
Proof. Consider some pair P = {i, j} ∈ P with i < j, and let x ∈ {i, j} be the vertex not in
U , and y ∈ {i, j} be the vertex in U . Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists an
alternating cycle C in HM that contains at least one edge labeled +2 by labelM and which
consists only of edges from the Pair Selector gadget associated with P .
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Figure 6: The path constructed in the proof of Lemma 5.4, highlighted in yellow.
First, suppose that {ax, cx} ∈ E(C). Then, since {cx, bx} ∈ M , we have that {cx, bx} ∈
E(C). Since the only neighbor in the gadget of bx apart from cx is ax, we have that {bx, ax} ∈
E(C). However, we have thus “closed” a triangle, which contradicts the choice of C as an
alternating cycle.
By Lemma 5.2 and since C contains at least one edge labeled +2 by labelM , it must
hold that {ax, bx} ∈ E(C). Then, since {cx, bx} ∈ M , we have that {cx, bx} − {bx, ax} is a
subpath of C. Now, note that cx prefers bx over its two other neighbors in the gadget, and
fyx prefers dy over cx. Therefore, {cx, fyx} is labeled -2 by labelM , and hence it does not
exist in HM . Thus, we also have that {dy, cx} ∈ E(C), and since {dy, fyx} ∈ M , we have that
{fyx, dy} − {dy, cx} − {cx, bx} − {bx, ax} is a subpath of C (see Fig. 6). However, fyx has no
neighbor in HM apart from dy, and therefore we have reached a contradiction to the choice of
C as an alternating cycle.
Lemma 5.5. For any T ∈ T , there is no alternating cycle in HM that contains at least one
edge labeled +2 by labelM and which consists only of edges from the Triple Selector gadget
associated with T .
Proof. Consider some triple T = {i, j, k} ∈ T with i < j < k, and let x ∈ {i, j, k} be the vertex
not in U , and y, z ∈ {i, j, k} be the two vertices in U such that dx prefers dy over dz. Suppose,
by way of contradiction, that there exists an alternating cycle C in HM that contains at least
one edge labeled +2 by labelM and which consists only of edges from the Triple Selector gadget
associated with T .
First, suppose that {ax, cx} ∈ E(C). Then, since {cx, bx} ∈ M , we have that {cx, bx} ∈
E(C). Since the only neighbor in the gadget of bx apart from cx is ax, we have that {bx, ax} ∈
E(C). However, we have thus “closed” a triangle, which contradicts the choice of C as an
alternating cycle.
By Lemma 5.2 and since C contains at least one edge labeled +2 by labelM , it must hold
that {ax, bx} ∈ E(C). Then, since {cx, bx} ∈ M and {ax, dx} ∈ M , we have that {cx, bx} −
{bx, ax} − {ax, dx} is a subpath of C. Observe that cx prefers bx over cz, and cz prefers cy
over cx. Moreover, dx prefers ax over dy, and dy prefers dz over dx. Therefore, both {cx, cz}
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Figure 7: The path constructed in the proof of Lemma 5.5, highlighted in yellow.
and {dx, dy} are labeled -2 by labelM , which means that these two edges do not exist in HM .
Since the only neighbor of cx in the gadget except for ax, bx and cz is cy, and since the only
neighbor of dx in the gadget except for ax and dy is dz, we have that {cy, cx}, {dx, dz} ∈ E(C).
Since {cz, cy}, {dz, dy} ∈M , this means that {cz, cy}−{cy, cx}−{cx, bx}−{bx, ax}−{ax, dx}−
{dx, dz} − {dz, dy} is a subpath of C. Now, since the only neighbor of dy in the gadget except
for dx and dz is ay, we have that {dy, ay} ∈ E(C). Because {ay, by} ∈ M , and since the only
neighbor of by in this gadget except for ay is cy, this means that {cz, cy} − {cy, cx} − {cx, bx} −
{bx, ax} − {ax, dx} − {dx, dz} − {dz, dy} − {dy, ay} − {ay, by} − {by, cy} is a subpath of C (see
Fig. 7). However, cy has three different neighbors on this path, which contradicts the choice of
C as an alternating cycle.
Next, in the following two lemmas, we argue that a shortest “bad” alternating path, as well
as a “bad” alternating cycle, cannot contain any vertex of the form uei . The proof of the second
lemma is essentially a simplified version of the proof of the first one, but we present the full
details for the sake of clarity.
Lemma 5.6. Let S be a shortest alternating path in HM that contains at least two edges labeled
+2 by labelM . Then, S does not contain the vertex u
e
i for any e ∈ E(G) and i ∈ e.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that S contains the vertex uei for some e ∈ E(G) and
i ∈ e. Then, since {uei , uej} ∈ M for the vertex j ∈ V (G) such that e = {i, j}, we have that
{uei , uej} ∈ E(S). Since U is a vertex cover in G, at least one vertex in {i, j} belongs to U , and
let us suppose without loss of generality that this vertex is i. Then, {ai, bi} ∈M , which means
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that labelM ({bi, uei}) = −2. Thus, {bi, uei} /∈ E(HM ). Since the only neighbors of uei in H
are bi and u
e
j , the only neighbors of u
e
j in H are bj and u
e
i , this implies that u
i
e is an endpoint
of S and {uej , bj} ∈ E(S). Since uej prefers uei over bj , we have that labelM ({bj , uej}) 6= +2.
Thus, by removing {uei , uej} and {bj , uej} from S, we obtain yet another alternating path in HM
that contains at least two edges labeled +2 by labelM . This contradicts the choice of S as the
shortest alternating path in HM with this property.
Lemma 5.7. There is no alternating cycle in HM that contains the vertex u
e
i for any e ∈ E(G)
and i ∈ e.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists an alternating cycle C in HM that
contains the vertex uei for some e ∈ E(G) and i ∈ e. Then, since {uei , uej} ∈ M for the vertex
j ∈ V (G) such that e = {i, j}, we have that {uei , uej} ∈ E(C). Since U is a vertex cover in
G, at least one vertex in {i, j} belongs to U , and let us suppose without loss of generality
that this vertex is i. Then, {ai, bi} ∈ M , which means that labelM ({bi, uei}) = −2. Thus,
{bi, uei} /∈ E(HM ). Since the only neighbors of uei in H are bi and uej , this implies that C cannot
be a cycle, and hence we have reached a contradiction.
Conclusion of the forward direction. First, by Observation 5.1, there is no alternating
path in HM that starts from a vertex not matched by M and contains at least one edge labeled
+2 by labelM . Now, by Lemmas 5.6 and 5.7, if there exists an alternating cycle in HM that
contains at least one edge labeled +2 by labelM , or an alternating path in HM that contains
at least two edges labeled +2 by labelM , then there also exists such a cycle or path that
does not contain any vertex in {uei : e ∈ E(G), i ∈ e}. However, if we remove the vertices in
{uei : e ∈ E(G), i ∈ e} from H, then the remaining connected components are precisely the Pair
Selector and Triple Selector gadgets. By Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4, there exists no alternating cycle
in HM that contains at least one edge labeled +2 by labelM , as well as no alternating path in
HM that contains at least two edges labeled +2 by labelM , which consists only of edges of a
Pair Selector gadget. Moreover, by Lemmas 5.3 and 5.5, the same claim holds also with respect
to a Triple Selector gadget. Thus, by Proposition 2.1, we conclude that M is popular.
5.2 Reverse Direction
Here, we prove that if there exists a popular matching in reduction(I) = (H,L = {`v : v ∈
V (H)}), then there exists a solution to the instance (G,P, T ) of Partitioned Vertex Cover.
For this purpose, let us suppose that M is a popular matching in (H,L = {`v : v ∈ V (H)}).
In what follows, we first construct a subset U ⊆ V (G). Then, we will show that U is a vertex
cover of G. Afterwards, we will show that for every P ∈ P, it holds that |U ∩ P | = 1. Lastly,
we will show that for every T ∈ T , it holds that |U ∩ T | = 2, which will conclude the proof.
Before implementing this plan, let us give a folklore observation (that is true for any graph
and preference lists) that will be used in all proofs ahead.
Observation 5.2. Let J be an instance of Popular Matching. Every popular matching in
J is a maximal matching.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there exists a popular matching M̂ in J that is
not maximal. Then, there exists an edge {x, y} that is present in the graph in J , and with both
endpoints not matched by M̂ . However, by adding {x, y} to M̂ , we obtain a matching more
popular than M̂ , and thus reach a contradiction.
Construction of U . We simply define U := {i ∈ V (G) : {ai, bi} ∈M}.
15
Proof that U is a vertex cover. The proof the U is a vertex cover is the same as a proof
given by Kavitha [17]. However, for the sake of completeness, and also to verify that although
our construction has other components, that same proof still goes through, we will present the
details in Appendix B. Here, we state the claim we need in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.8. The set U is a vertex cover of G.
Proof that U is a solution. Since we have already established that U is a vertex cover, the
proof that U is a solution will follow from the correctness of the two following lemmas.
Lemma 5.9. For every P ∈ P, it holds that |U ∩ P | = 1.
Proof. Let us consider some arbitrary pair P = {i, j} ∈ P. By Lemma 5.8, and because a pair
is also an edge in G, we have that |U ∩ P | ≥ 1. Thus, to prove the lemma, it suffices to show
that it is not possible to have |U ∩ P | = 2. To this end, suppose by way of contradiction that
|U ∩ P | = 2. By the definition of U , both {ai, bi} ∈ M and {aj , bj} ∈ M . Note that the only
neighbors of ci besides ai and bi are fji and dj , the only neighbors of fji are ci and dj , and the
only neighbors of dj besides aj are ci and fij . Thus, by Observation 5.2, M must contain exactly
one of the edges {ci, dj}, {dj , fji} and {fji, ci}. If {ci, dj} ∈ M , then by replacing this edge by
{fji, ci}, we obtain a more popular matching (both ci and fji vote in favor of the replacement,
while only dj votes against it). If {dj , fji} ∈ M , then by replacing this edge by {ci, dj}, we
obtain a more popular matching (both ci and dj vote in favor of the replacement, while only
fji votes against it). If {fji, ci} ∈M , then by replacing this edge by {dj , fji}, we obtain a more
popular matching (both dj and fji vote in favor of the replacement, while only ci votes against
it). Since every case led to a contradiction, the proof is complete.
Lemma 5.10. For every T ∈ T , it holds that |U ∩ T | = 2.
Proof. Let us consider some arbitrary triple T = {i, j, k} ∈ T . By Lemma 5.8, and because a
triple is also a triangle in G, we have that |U ∩ T | ≥ 2. Thus, to prove the lemma, it suffices to
show that it is not possible to have |U ∩ T | = 3. To this end, suppose by way of contradiction
that |U ∩ T | = 3. By the definition of U , all the three edges {ai, bi}, {aj , bj} and {ak, bk}
belong to M . Note that the only neighbors of di besides ai are dj and dk, the only neighbors
of dj besides aj are di and dk, and the only neighbors of dk besides ak are di and dj . Thus,
by Observation 5.2, M must contain exactly one of the edges {di, dj}, {dj , dk} and {dk, di}. If
{di, dj} ∈M , then by replacing this edge by {dj , dk}, we obtain a more popular matching (both
dj and dk vote in favor of the replacement, while only di votes against it). If {dj , dk} ∈M , then
by replacing this edge by {dk, di}, we obtain a more popular matching (both di and dk vote in
favor of the replacement, while only dj votes against it). If {dk, di} ∈ M , then by replacing
this edge by {di, dj}, we obtain a more popular matching (both di and dj vote in favor of the
replacement, while only dk votes against it). Since every case led to a contradiction, the proof
is complete.
References
[1] Deciding the existence of popular matchings. Egres Open ( http://lemon.cs.elte.hu/
egres/open/Deciding_the_existence_of_popular_matchings ). 2
[2] D. J. Abraham, R. W. Irving, T. Kavitha, and K. Mehlhorn, Popular matchings,
in Proceedings of SODA ’05: the 16th ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms
(ACM-SIAM), 2007. 2
16
[3] P. Biro´, , R. W. Irving, and D. F. Manlove, Popular matchings in the marriage and
roommates problems, in Algorithms and Complexity, 2010, pp. 97–108. 2
[4] K. S. Chung, On the existence of stable roommate matchings, Games and Economic
Behavior, 33 (2000), pp. 206–230. 2
[5] A. Cseh, Popular matchings. Combinatorial Optimization, Hausdorff Trimester
Program, 2015 (http://www.him.uni-bonn.de/combinatorial-optimization-2015/);
video of the talk is available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4U1rCHEOvuk&list=
PLul8LCT3AJqSWmpRDmOtqL1t7N9s3y_Oo&index=31&t=0s . 2
[6] , Popular Matchings – Trends in Computational Social Choice, 2017. 2
[7] A´. Cseh, C. Huang, and T. Kavitha, Popular matchings with two-sided preferences
and one-sided ties, SIAM J. Discrete Math., 31 (2017), pp. 2348–2377. 2, 3
[8] A´. Cseh and T. Kavitha, Popular edges and dominant matchings, in Proceedings of
IPCO: 18th International Conference Integer Programming and Combinatorial Optimiza-
tion, 2016, 2016, pp. 138–151. 2
[9] M.-J.-A.-N. de C. (Marquis de) Condorcet, Essai sur l’application de l’analyse a` la
probabilite´ des de´cisions rendues a` la pluralite´ des voix, De l’Imprimerie royale, M. DC-
CLXXXV, 1785. 1
[10] D. Gale and L. Shapley, College admissions and the stability of marriage, The American
Mathematical Monthly, 69 (1962), pp. 9–15. 3
[11] P. Ga¨rdenfors, Match making: assignments based on bilateral preferences, Behavioural
Science, 20 (1975), pp. 166–173. 1
[12] C. Huang and T. Kavitha, Near-popular matchings in the roommates problem, SIAM
J. Discrete Math., 27 (2013), pp. 43–62. 2
[13] , Popular matchings in the stable marriage problem, Inf. Comput., 222 (2013), pp. 180–
194. 2, 4
[14] C. Huang, T. Kavitha, D. Michail, and M. Nasre, Bounded unpopularity matchings,
in Proceedings SWAT’08 — 11th Scandinavian Workshop on Algorithm Theory, 2008,
pp. 127–137. 2
[15] C.-C. Huang and T. Kavitha, Popularity mixed matchings and self-duality, in Proceed-
ings SODA’17–, 2017. 2
[16] T. Kavitha, A size-popularity tradeoff in the stable marriage problem, SIAM J. Comput.,
43 (2014), pp. 52–71. 2, 3
[17] , Max-size popular matchings and extensions, CoRR, abs/1802.07440 (2018). 2, 5, 6,
16
[18] T. Kavitha, J. Mestre, and M. Nasre, Popular mixed matchings, Theor. Comput.
Sci., 412 (2011), pp. 2679–2690. 2
[19] T. Kavitha and M. Nasre, Optimal popular matchings, Discrete Applied Mathematics,
157 (2009), pp. 3181–3186. 2
[20] , Popular matchings with variable job capacities, in Proceedings of ISAAC — 20th
International Symposium Algorithms and Computation, 2009, 2009, pp. 423–433. 2
17
[21] T. Kira´ly and Z. Me´sza´ros-Karkus, Finding strongly popular b-matchings in bipartite
graphs, Electronic Notes in Discrete Mathematics 2017, (2017). 2
[22] D. Manlove, The house allocation problem (with applications to reviewer assignment).
Summer School on Matching Problems, Markets, and Mechanisms, Budapest 2013 (http:
//econ.core.hu/english/res/MatchingSchool.html); slides are available at http://
econ.core.hu/file/download//summer_manlove2.ppt . 2
[23] D. Manlove and C. T. S. Sng, Popular matchings in the capacitated house allocation
problem, in Proceedings ESA’06 — 14th Annual European Symposium, 2006, pp. 492–503.
2
[24] D. F. Manlove, Algorithmics of matching under preferences, vol. 2 of Theoretical Com-
puter Science, World Scientific, 2013. 1, 2
[25] R. M. McCutchen, The least-unpopularity-factor and least-unpopularity-margin criteria
for matching problems with one-sided preferences, in LATIN 2008: Theoretical Informatics,
2008, pp. 593–604. 2
[26] A. Roth, On the allocation of residents to rural hospitals: A general property of two-sided
matching markets, Econometrica, 54 (1986), pp. 425—427. 2
[27] M. Sipser, Introduction to the Theory of Computation, Thomson Course Technology, 2006.
5, 18
[28] Y. Xiao, Z. Han, C. Yuen, and L. A. DaSilva, Carrier aggregation between operators
in next generation cellular networks: A stable roommate market, IEEE Transactions on
Wireless Communications, (2016). 1
A Proof of Lemma 3.1
In an instance of 3-SAT, we are given a set of variables X, and a formula encoded as a collection
of clauses C. Each clause C ∈ C is a set of exactly three literals, where each literal is either a
variable x ∈ X or the negation of a variable x ∈ X that is denoted by x. A truth assignment
α : X → {T,F} satisfies a literal ` if either it is positive and assigned truth, or negative and
assigned false. Now, α satisfies a clause if it satisfies at least one of its literals, and it satisfies C
if it satisfy every clause in C. The objective is to decide whether there exists a truth assignment
that satisfies C.
The 3-SAT problem is NP-hard, and below we give the well-known classic reduction from 3-
SAT to Vertex Cover that shows that Vertex Cover is NP-hard. This result is summarized
in Proposition A.1. Afterwards, we argue how the instance outputted by the reduction can be
viewed as an instance of Partitioned Vertex Cover, and thus conclude the proof of Lemma
3.1.
Reduction from 3-SAT to Partitioned Vertex Cover. Let I = (X, C). Then, we
construct an instance reduction(I) = (G, k) of Vertex Cover as follows. First, define k =
|X|+ 2|C|. Now, for every x ∈ X, add two new vertices vx and vx, along with the edge {vx, vx},
to G. For every clause C = {p, q, r} ∈ C, add three new vertices uCp , uCq and uCr , along with the
edges {uCp , uCq }, {uCq , uCr } and {uCr , uCp } to G. Finally, for every C ∈ C and ` ∈ C, add the edge
{uC` , v`} to G. It is easy to verify that the following result holds (see, e.g., [27]).
Proposition A.1 ([27]). Let I = (X, C) be an instance of 3-SAT. Then, I has a satisfying
assignment if and only if G has a vertex cover of size at most k where (G, k) = reduction(I).
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The viewpoint of Partitioned Vertex Cover. Given the output instance (G, k) of the
reduction, we define P = {{vx, vx : x ∈ X} and T = {{uCp , uCq , uCr } : C = {p, q, r} ∈ C}. Clearly,
the sets in P∪T are pairwise disjoint, every set in P is an edge in G, and every set in T induces
a triangle in G. Moreover, every vertex cover of G must select at least one vertex of each edge
in E(G), and at least two vertices of every triangle in G. Since |P| = |X| and |T | = 2|C|, this
means that G has a vertex cover of size at most k if and only if G has a vertex cover of size
exactly k, and the latter statement holds if and only if (G,P, T ) has a solution. By Proposition
A.1, this concludes the proof of Lemma 3.1.
B Proof of Lemma 5.8
Towards the proof of Lemma 5.8, we first prove the following claim.
Claim B.1. For every i ∈ V (G), we have that
• {ai, bi} ∈M , or
• both {ai, di} ∈M and {bi, ci} ∈M .
Proof. Consider some i ∈ V (G). First, note that ai is the top preference of every vertex among
its neighbors. Therefore, if ai is not matched by M , then we can match it to any of its neighbors
(so if that neighbor was matched, its former matching partner is now unmatched), and get two
votes in favor of the change and at most one vote against it, which means that M is not popular.
Therefore, ai must be matched by M .
Let us now rule out the possibility that ai is matched to ci by M . If ai is matched to ci, then
bi must be matched to u
e
i for some edge e incident to i, as otherwise by removing {ai, ci} from M
and adding {ai, bi} to it instead, we obtain a more popular matching. Denote e = {i, j}. Then,
by removing {ai, ci}, {bi, uei} and {uej , bj} (if {uej , bj} ∈ M), and adding {ai, bi} and {uei , uej},
we get four votes in favor of the change (from ai, bi, u
e
i and u
e
j) and at most two votes against
it (from ci and possibly bj), which contradicts the popularity of M .
It remains to show that if ai is matched to di, then bi is matched to ci. To this end, suppose
that ai is matched to di. If bi is unmatched, then by removing {ai, di} and adding {bi, ai}, we
obtain a more popular matching. Thus, if bi is not matched to ci, then it must be matched to
uei for some edge e = {i, j} incident to i. In this case, where bi is matched to uei , by removing
{ai, di}, {bi, uei} and {uej , bj} (if {uej , bj} ∈ M), and adding {ai, bi} and {uei , uej}, we get four
votes in favor of the change (from ai, bi, u
e
i and u
e
j) and at most two votes against it (from di
and possibly bj), which contradicts the popularity of M .
We now proceed with the proof of the lemma. To this end, let {i, j} ∈ E(G) be an arbitrarily
chosen edge. To prove that this edge is covered by U , we need to show that at least one edge
among {ai, bi} and {aj , bj} is in M . Suppose, by way of contradiction, that this statement
is false. Then, by Claim B.1, it holds that {ai, di}, {bi, ci}, {aj , dj}, {bj , cj} ∈ M . In this case,
{uei , uej} must be in M (else they are not matched, which contradicts Observation 5.2). Then, we
remove {ai, di}, {bi, ci}, {uei , uej}, {aj , dj} and {bj , cj} from M , and add {ai, ci}, {bi, uei}, {aj , cj}
and {bj , uej} to M . Then, we gain six votes in favor of the replacement (from ai, aj , bi, bj , ci and
cj) and only four votes against it (from di, dj , u
e
i and u
e
j), which contradicts the popularity of
M . This completes the proof of the lemma.
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